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 <title>All Content Related to Vietnam</title>
 <link>http://opennet.net/country/vietnam</link>
 <description>The taxonomy view with a depth of 0.</description>
 <language>en</language>
<item>
 <title>Vietnam</title>
 <link>http://opennet.net/research/profiles/vietnam</link>
 <description>&lt;h2&gt;Background&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Now a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is attempting simultaneously to promote the development of information communications technology (ICT) and e-commerce while struggling to limit access to content that might destabilize the communist state and undermine its control. Although citizens are legally allowed to question corruption, economic policy, and government deficiencies, the line is drawn at political criticism involving government leaders, political parties and multiparty democracy, and sensitive social and diplomatic issues. After a period of relative openness and tolerance of independent voices and criticism in 2006, where liberal publications were established, the government clamped down and launched a crackdown on what it considers unlawful usage of the Internet. Authorities continue to detain a number of individuals for Internet activities, such as discussing political reform over Voice-over Internet Protocol (VoIP).&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref1_8q8z102&quot; title=&quot;Deutsche Presse-Agentur, “Vietnam youths arrested over internet chats released after 9 months,” August 16, 2006.&quot; href=&quot;#footnote1_8q8z102&quot;&gt;1&lt;/a&gt;  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Internet in Vietnam&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Vietnam’s Internet system is growing and changing rapidly, and it is difficult to describe the situation “on the ground” with complete accuracy. From 2005 to 2006, the number of Internet users reportedly jumped from 9.2 million to 14.5 million, yielding an Internet penetration rate of 17 percent.&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref2_yplbm49&quot; title=&quot;Thai Press Reports, “E-commerce services extended in 2006,” January 4, 2007.&quot; href=&quot;#footnote2_yplbm49&quot;&gt;2&lt;/a&gt; Because more than half of the population is under thirty and a significant portion of individual users use cybercafés for online gaming and access to the Internet, control over these venues is an important priority for the state.&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref3_wp15y75&quot; title=&quot;//www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews/business/16475618.htm. &quot; href=&quot;#footnote3_wp15y75&quot;&gt;3&lt;/a&gt; Postal offices are also important providers of Internet access. VoIP is an increasingly popular means of communication.&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref4_tbdnueu&quot; title=&quot; Internet, 15, July 30, 2006.&quot; href=&quot;#footnote4_tbdnueu&quot;&gt;4&lt;/a&gt; Although the state affirmatively seeks to enhance the competitive edge of domestic enterprises, Vietnamese online services are still nascent, and there are few search engines currently available to Vietnamese users. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;State regulation determines how Internet connectivity in Vietnam is organized and managed, and facilitates Internet content filtering by limiting external access points that must be controlled.&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref5_towr7sh&quot; title=&quot;See Articles 27–38, decree no. 55/2001/ND-CP of the Government on the management, provision and use of the Internet services, issued on August 23, 2001.&quot; href=&quot;#footnote5_towr7sh&quot;&gt;5&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Only Internet exchange points (IXPs) can connect to the international Internet, while online service providers (OSPs) and Internet content providers (ICPs) may connect to ISPs and IXPs.&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref6_xr9k9kl&quot; title=&quot;Article 27, decree no. 55/2001/ND-CP.&quot; href=&quot;#footnote6_xr9k9kl&quot;&gt;6&lt;/a&gt; At the edge of the network, Internet agents, such as cybercafés, connect to their contracted ISP.&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref7_kek7ta1&quot; title=&quot;Article 27, decree no. 55/2001/ND-CP.&quot; href=&quot;#footnote7_kek7ta1&quot;&gt;7&lt;/a&gt; ISPs may connect with each other and with IXPs, but private ISPs may not connect with each other in peering arrangements.&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref8_h7u29ze&quot; title=&quot;Article 27, decree no. 55/2001/ND-CP.&quot; href=&quot;#footnote8_h7u29ze&quot;&gt;8&lt;/a&gt; Currently, IXPs can theoretically maintain independent connections to the international Internet, but it is not clear how many do so in practice. Vietnam controls the allocation of domain names under the country code top-level domain, “.vn,” through the Vietnam Internet Center,&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref9_s51djmu&quot; title=&quot;See Article 3, decision no. 27/2005/QD-BBCVT; IANA, .vn – Vietnam, http://www.iana.org/root-whois/vn.htm. &quot; href=&quot;#footnote9_s51djmu&quot;&gt;9&lt;/a&gt; and is also planning to implement a state-controlled Vietnamese-language second-level domain.&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref10_f733o2c&quot; title=&quot;See Article 7, decision no. 27/2005/QD-BBCVT.&quot; href=&quot;#footnote10_f733o2c&quot;&gt;10&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Legal and regulatory frameworks&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Vietnam’s legal regulation of Internet access and content is multilayered and complex, and can occur at the level of National Assembly legislation, ministerial decisions, or through VNPT rules created for the management of the Internet infrastructure. Although Vietnam nominally guarantees freedom of speech, of the press, and of assembly through constitutional provisions,&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref11_mcoxg1t&quot; title=&quot;//www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/vm00000_.html. &quot; href=&quot;#footnote11_mcoxg1t&quot;&gt;11&lt;/a&gt; state security laws and other regulations trump or eliminate these formal protections. Media in Vietnam are state-owned, and they are under increasingly tight control by the state. Effective July 1, 2006, the Decree on Cultural and Information Activities subjects those who disseminate &quot;reactionary ideology&quot; including revealing secrets (party, state, military, and economic), who deny revolutionary achievements, and who do not submit articles for review before publication to fines of up to thirty million dong (USD2,000).&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref12_11k9x61&quot; title=&quot;//www.seapabkk.org/newdesign/newsdetail.php?No=485. &quot; href=&quot;#footnote12_11k9x61&quot;&gt;12&lt;/a&gt; These regulations appear to target journalists, as criminal liability already exists for some of the proscribed activities, including the dissemination of state secrets. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;All information stored on, sent over, or retrieved from the Internet must comply with Vietnam’s Press Law, Publication Law, and other laws, including state secrets and intellectual property protections.&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref13_uu6doug&quot; title=&quot;Article 6(1), decree no. 55/2001/ND-CP of the Government on the management, provision and use of the Internet services, issued on August 23, 2001.&quot; href=&quot;#footnote13_uu6doug&quot;&gt;13&lt;/a&gt; All domestic and foreign individuals and organizations involved in Internet activity in Vietnam are legally responsible for content created, disseminated, and stored. New monitoring software issued by the Ministry of Posts and Telematics in July 2006 requires ISPs to record the identity and Internet behavior of users at Internet kiosks, and to store the information on their servers for one year.&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref14_y8344uu&quot; title=&quot;//www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78796.htm. &quot; href=&quot;#footnote14_y8344uu&quot;&gt;14&lt;/a&gt; Relevant legislation and administrative decrees may not be consistently enforced—such as the requirements to track IDs and record personal information as a condition for access in cybercafés that appears to be largely ignored in cities such as Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi.&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref15_hlyuodh&quot; title=&quot;//www.opennet.net/studies/vietnam/. &quot; href=&quot;#footnote15_hlyuodh&quot;&gt;15&lt;/a&gt; However, they do provide the state with considerable authority and discretion to control how citizens get online.  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Just as ISPs and cybercafés are required to install monitoring software and store information on users, all users are also formally deputized to report content that opposes the state or threatens state security to the relevant authorities.&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref16_u52ltbj&quot; title=&quot;Article 6(2), decree no. 55/2001/ND-CP of the Government on the management, provision and use of the Internet services, issued on August 23, 2001; Article III, Joint Circular no. 02/2005/TTLT-BCVT-¬VHTT-CA-KHDT of July 14, 2005, on management of Internet agents, issued by the the Ministry of Post and Telematics, the Ministry of Culture and Information, the Ministry of Public Security, and the Ministry of Planning and Investment on July 14, 2005.&quot; href=&quot;#footnote16_u52ltbj&quot;&gt;16&lt;/a&gt; It is unlawful to use Internet resources or host material that opposes the state; destabilizes Vietnam’s security, economy, or social order; incites opposition to the state; discloses state secrets; infringes organizations’ or individuals’ rights; or interferes with the state’s Domain Name System (DNS) servers.&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref17_h803r57&quot; title=&quot;Article 2(2), Regulation on Management and Use of Internet Resources, decision no. 27/2005/ QD-BBCVT, issued by the Ministry of Post and Telematics on August 11, 2005.&quot; href=&quot;#footnote17_h803r57&quot;&gt;17&lt;/a&gt; Those who violate Internet use rules are subject to a range of penalties, from fines to criminal liability for offenses such as causing chaos or security order. The National Assembly enacted the Law on Information Technology on June 22, 2006.&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref18_7pdtm6n&quot; title=&quot;Thai Press Reports, “Vietnam post and telecommunication sector records outstanding achievements in 2006,” January 1, 2007. &quot; href=&quot;#footnote18_7pdtm6n&quot;&gt;18&lt;/a&gt;  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Regulatory responsibility for Internet material is divided along subject-matter lines in Vietnam. While the Ministry of Culture and Information focuses on sexually explicit, superstitious, or violent content, the Ministry of Public Security monitors customers who access politically sensitive sites.&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref19_gq0o4x0&quot; title=&quot;BBC Monitoring International Reports, “Vietnamese Security Ministry establishes special unit to tackle Internet crime,” August 4, 2004.&quot; href=&quot;#footnote19_gq0o4x0&quot;&gt;19&lt;/a&gt;  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;ONI testing results&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Testing was conducted from various access points (including hotel, cybercafé, and wireless connections) on two ISPs: FPT and VNPT. VNPT returns a “blockpage” indicating that the requested site was prohibited; FPT indicates that the filtered site does not exist, a form of DNS tampering where the listings for filtered sites had been removed from its DNS server. Our testing of Vietnam’s Internet filtering found that the state concentrates its blocking on content about overseas political opposition, overseas and independent media, human rights, and religious topics. Proxies and circumvention tools, the use of which is illegal,&lt;a class=&quot;see_footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref20_h2h3u0d&quot; title=&quot;Article I s.3, Joint Circular no. 02/2005/TTLT-BCVT-VHTT-CA-KHDT&quot; href=&quot;#footnote20_h2h3u0d&quot;&gt;20&lt;/a&gt; were the major exception and a substantial number were inaccessible on both ISPs.  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A large majority of blocked and inaccessible content was specific to Vietnam—either in the Vietnamese language or related to Vietnamese issues, with a significant number of filtered sites operating out of California. Sites only in English or French, or from the global list, were rarely blocked. For example, the domain for Radio Free Asia (&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.rfa.org&quot; title=&quot;www.rfa.org&quot;&gt;www.rfa.org&lt;/a&gt;) was blocked only on FPT, although RFA’s Vietnamese-language home page (&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.rfa.org/vietnamese/&quot; title=&quot;www.rfa.org/vietnamese/&quot;&gt;www.rfa.org/vietnamese/&lt;/a&gt;) was blocked by both ISPs. At the same time, however, sites only tangentially or indirectly critical of the government, such as content focusing on local communities (&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nguoidan.net;&quot; title=&quot;http://www.nguoidan.net;&quot;&gt;http://www.nguoidan.net;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;http://vietnamdaily.com/&quot; title=&quot;http://vietnamdaily.com/&quot;&gt;http://vietnamdaily.com/&lt;/a&gt;) or world news aggregation (&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.thongluan.org&quot; title=&quot;http://www.thongluan.org&quot;&gt;http://www.thongluan.org&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.danchimviet.com/php/index.php&quot; title=&quot;http://www.danchimviet.com/php/index.php&quot;&gt;http://www.danchimviet.com/php/index.php&lt;/a&gt;) were also blocked, along with sites voicing strong anti-communist sentiments (&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.conong.com&quot; title=&quot;http://www.conong.com&quot;&gt;http://www.conong.com&lt;/a&gt; and &lt;a href=&quot;http://vietnamvietnam.com/&quot; title=&quot;http://vietnamvietnam.com/&quot;&gt;http://vietnamvietnam.com/&lt;/a&gt;). Although a large number of overseas sites focusing on political opposition and reform (such as the Free Vietnam Alliance at &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.lmvntd.org/&quot; title=&quot;http://www.lmvntd.org/&quot;&gt;http://www.lmvntd.org/&lt;/a&gt;) were filtered, the only human rights Web site on the global list to be blocked by either (and in this case both) ISP belonged to the NGO Human Rights Watch (&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.hrw.org&quot; title=&quot;www.hrw.org&quot;&gt;www.hrw.org&lt;/a&gt;).  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Certain religious content, such as pages on religious freedom, Buddhism, and Caodai (&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.caodai.net/&quot; title=&quot;http://www.caodai.net/&quot;&gt;http://www.caodai.net/&lt;/a&gt;) are blocked to a limited degree. Some topics, such as the Montagnard people who assisted the United States during the war with Vietnam and who are commonly Christians, overlap multiple categories (such as the Montagnard Human Rights Organization Web site &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.mhro.org/&quot; title=&quot;http://www.mhro.org/&quot;&gt;http://www.mhro.org/&lt;/a&gt;) and are filtered accordingly.  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Surprisingly, Vietnam does not block any pornographic content (though it does filter one site ONI tested with links to adult material), despite the state’s putative focus on preventing access to sexually explicit material. The state’s filtering practices are thus in obvious tension with the purported justification for these actions.  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ONI has concluded that commercial filtering lists are not being used in Vietnam for several reasons: the pattern of blocking does not conform to any software product that ONI has studied, the observed pattern of deleting DNS records for prohibited sites is inconsistent with using Web filtering software, and the greater filtering of Vietnamese-language sites on a given topic compared with English-language sites. However, VNPT may be using a commercial product for filtering. Through multiple rounds of testing, inconsistencies in filtering persisted and evolved, also indicating that the Vietnamese state or Vietnamese ISPs are compiling their own block lists. For example, the news site &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.saigonbao.com/&quot; title=&quot;http://www.saigonbao.com/&quot;&gt;http://www.saigonbao.com/&lt;/a&gt;, blocked earlier in 2006 by both FPT and VNPT, was inaccessible only on VNPT when tested at the end of the year. VNPT also filtered a range of sites that were accessible on FPT, primarily independent media, human rights (from the Vietnam Human Rights Network to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Web sites), and overseas community (the Vietnam American National Gala awards) and political content.  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Conclusion&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Vietnam’s filtering regime is multilayered, relying not only on computing technology but also on threats of legal liability, state-based and private monitoring of users’ online activities, and informal pressures such as supervision by employees or other users in cybercafés. Over time, the state’s online filtering has expanded, both in the content blocked for a given topic and the number of content categories that are targeted. Although purporting to protect national security and block obscene content, Vietnam actually focuses on blocking access to sites within an expansive definition of political “opposition” that includes the activities of Vietnamese communities overseas. Although the Vietnamese state’s blocking of access to certain content on the Internet can be circumvented by users with technical knowledge, ordinary users will likely continue to find that filtering distorts their information environment.  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;NOTES&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;ol class=&quot;footnotes&quot;&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote1_8q8z102&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref1_8q8z102&quot;&gt;1.&lt;/a&gt; Deutsche Presse-Agentur, “Vietnam youths arrested over internet chats released after 9 months,” August 16, 2006.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote2_yplbm49&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref2_yplbm49&quot;&gt;2.&lt;/a&gt; Thai Press Reports, “E-commerce services extended in 2006,” January 4, 2007.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote3_wp15y75&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref3_wp15y75&quot;&gt;3.&lt;/a&gt; Paul Budde Communication Pty Ltd., 2006, Vietnam: Internet, 10, July 30, 2006. See also John Boudreau, “Bay Area entrepreneur leads way in online gaming in Vietnam,”&lt;br /&gt;
The Mercury News, January 17, 2007, &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews/business/16475618.htm&quot; title=&quot;http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews/business/16475618.htm&quot;&gt;http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews/business/16475618.htm&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote4_tbdnueu&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref4_tbdnueu&quot;&gt;4.&lt;/a&gt; Paul Budde Communication Pty Ltd., 2006, Vietnam: Internet, 15, July 30, 2006.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote5_towr7sh&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref5_towr7sh&quot;&gt;5.&lt;/a&gt; See Articles 27–38, decree no. 55/2001/ND-CP of the Government on the management, provision and use of the Internet services, issued on August 23, 2001.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote6_xr9k9kl&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref6_xr9k9kl&quot;&gt;6.&lt;/a&gt; Article 27, decree no. 55/2001/ND-CP.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote7_kek7ta1&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref7_kek7ta1&quot;&gt;7.&lt;/a&gt; Article 27, decree no. 55/2001/ND-CP.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote8_h7u29ze&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref8_h7u29ze&quot;&gt;8.&lt;/a&gt; Article 27, decree no. 55/2001/ND-CP.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote9_s51djmu&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref9_s51djmu&quot;&gt;9.&lt;/a&gt; See Article 3, decision no. 27/2005/QD-BBCVT; IANA, .vn – Vietnam, &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.iana.org/root-whois/vn.htm&quot; title=&quot;http://www.iana.org/root-whois/vn.htm&quot;&gt;http://www.iana.org/root-whois/vn.htm&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote10_f733o2c&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref10_f733o2c&quot;&gt;10.&lt;/a&gt; See Article 7, decision no. 27/2005/QD-BBCVT.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote11_mcoxg1t&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref11_mcoxg1t&quot;&gt;11.&lt;/a&gt; Article 69, Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, adopted April 15, 1992, amended December 25, 2001, &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/vm00000_.html&quot; title=&quot;http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/vm00000_.html&quot;&gt;http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/vm00000_.html&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote12_11k9x61&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref12_11k9x61&quot;&gt;12.&lt;/a&gt; Southeast Asian Press Alliance (SEAPA), “Vietnam readies stricter press laws to rein back aggressive journalists,” June 16, 2006, &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.seapabkk.org/newdesign/newsdetail.php?No=485&quot; title=&quot;http://www.seapabkk.org/newdesign/newsdetail.php?No=485&quot;&gt;http://www.seapabkk.org/newdesign/newsdetail.php?No=485&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote13_uu6doug&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref13_uu6doug&quot;&gt;13.&lt;/a&gt; Article 6(1), decree no. 55/2001/ND-CP of the Government on the management, provision and use of the Internet services, issued on August 23, 2001.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote14_y8344uu&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref14_y8344uu&quot;&gt;14.&lt;/a&gt; U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2006: Vietnam, March 6, 2007, &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78796.htm&quot; title=&quot;http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78796.htm&quot;&gt;http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78796.htm&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote15_hlyuodh&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref15_hlyuodh&quot;&gt;15.&lt;/a&gt; OpenNet Initiative, Internet Filtering in Vietnam in 2005–2006: A Country Study, 19, August 2006, &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.opennet.net/studies/vietnam/&quot; title=&quot;http://www.opennet.net/studies/vietnam/&quot;&gt;http://www.opennet.net/studies/vietnam/&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote16_u52ltbj&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref16_u52ltbj&quot;&gt;16.&lt;/a&gt; Article 6(2), decree no. 55/2001/ND-CP of the Government on the management, provision and use of the Internet services, issued on August 23, 2001; Article III, Joint Circular no. 02/2005/TTLT-BCVT-¬VHTT-CA-KHDT of July 14, 2005, on management of Internet agents, issued by the the Ministry of Post and Telematics, the Ministry of Culture and Information, the Ministry of Public Security, and the Ministry of Planning and Investment on July 14, 2005.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote17_h803r57&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref17_h803r57&quot;&gt;17.&lt;/a&gt; Article 2(2), Regulation on Management and Use of Internet Resources, decision no. 27/2005/ QD-BBCVT, issued by the Ministry of Post and Telematics on August 11, 2005.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote18_7pdtm6n&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref18_7pdtm6n&quot;&gt;18.&lt;/a&gt; Thai Press Reports, “Vietnam post and telecommunication sector records outstanding achievements in 2006,” January 1, 2007. &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote19_gq0o4x0&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref19_gq0o4x0&quot;&gt;19.&lt;/a&gt; BBC Monitoring International Reports, “Vietnamese Security Ministry establishes special unit to tackle Internet crime,” August 4, 2004.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote&quot; name=&quot;footnote20_h2h3u0d&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref20_h2h3u0d&quot;&gt;20.&lt;/a&gt; Article I s.3, Joint Circular no. 02/2005/TTLT-BCVT-VHTT-CA-KHDT&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;
</description>
 <category domain="http://opennet.net/regions/asia">Asia</category>
 <category domain="http://opennet.net/country/vietnam">Vietnam</category>
 <pubDate>Wed, 09 May 2007 18:46:15 -0400</pubDate>
 <dc:creator>miriam</dc:creator>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">124 at http://opennet.net</guid>
</item>
<item>
 <title>The Boston Globe: Vietnam&#039;s new dissidents thrive via Internet</title>
 <link>http://opennet.net/blog/2006/10/the-boston-globe-vietnams-new-dissidents-thrive-internet</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;Matt Steinglass of &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.boston.com/news/globe/&quot;&gt;The Boston Globe&lt;/a&gt; sees blogs and Internet chats as facilitating the political activities of dissidents in Vietnam and fueling the push for democracy.  See &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.boston.com/news/world/asia/articles/2006/10/29/vietnams_new_dissidents_thrive_via_internet/?page=full&quot;&gt;full story&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
 <comments>http://opennet.net/blog/2006/10/the-boston-globe-vietnams-new-dissidents-thrive-internet#comments</comments>
 <category domain="http://opennet.net/regions/asia">Asia</category>
 <category domain="http://opennet.net/country/vietnam">Vietnam</category>
 <pubDate>Mon, 30 Oct 2006 09:50:10 -0500</pubDate>
 <dc:creator>nart</dc:creator>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">525 at http://opennet.net</guid>
</item>
<item>
 <title>Vietnam: Internet repression creates climate of fear</title>
 <link>http://opennet.net/blog/2006/10/vietnam-internet-repression-creates-climate-fear</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;&quot;A new report released [Oct. 22, 2006] by Amnesty International reveals a climate of fear in Viet Nam, with people afraid to post information online and Internet café owners forced to inform on their customers.&quot;  See AI &lt;a href=&quot;http://news.amnesty.org/index/ENGASA410102006&quot;&gt;press release &lt;/a&gt;and &lt;a href=&quot;http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engasa410082006&quot;&gt;full report &lt;/a&gt;for details.&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
 <comments>http://opennet.net/blog/2006/10/vietnam-internet-repression-creates-climate-fear#comments</comments>
 <category domain="http://opennet.net/regions/asia">Asia</category>
 <category domain="http://opennet.net/topics/surveillance">Surveillance</category>
 <category domain="http://opennet.net/country/vietnam">Vietnam</category>
 <pubDate>Mon, 23 Oct 2006 16:32:12 -0400</pubDate>
 <dc:creator>nart</dc:creator>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">523 at http://opennet.net</guid>
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<item>
 <title>Internet Filtering in Vietnam</title>
 <link>http://opennet.net/blog/2006/08/internet-filtering-vietnam</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;ONI has released today a report that finds an increase in Internet censorship in Vietnam.  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Drawing from technical, legal, and political sources, ONI’s research finds that the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is focusing its filtering on sites considered threatening to its one-party system.  Furthermore, the technical sophistication, breadth, and effectiveness of Vietnam’s filtering are increasing with time.  Similar to China, Vietnam has taken a multi-layered approach to controlling the Internet; Vietnam applies technical controls, the law, and education to restrict its citizens’ access to and use of information.   Vietnam is carrying out this filtering with a notable lack of transparency - while Vietnam claims its blocking efforts are aimed at safeguarding the country against obscene or sexually explicit content, most of its filtering efforts are aimed at blocking sites with politically or religiously sensitive material that could undermine Vietnam’s one-party system.  This is the latest in a series of case studies that address Internet filtering by states worldwide.  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/&quot;&gt;Click Here&lt;/a&gt; for the full report.&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
 <comments>http://opennet.net/blog/2006/08/internet-filtering-vietnam#comments</comments>
 <category domain="http://opennet.net/regions/asia">Asia</category>
 <category domain="http://opennet.net/topics/publications">Publications</category>
 <category domain="http://opennet.net/country/vietnam">Vietnam</category>
 <pubDate>Wed, 09 Aug 2006 11:22:20 -0400</pubDate>
 <dc:creator>nart</dc:creator>
 <guid isPermaLink="false">512 at http://opennet.net</guid>
</item>
<item>
 <title>Internet Filtering in Vietnam in 2005-2006: A Country Study</title>
 <link>http://opennet.net/studies/vietnam</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;/sites/opennet.net/files/ONI_Vietnam_Country_Study_0.pdf&gt;PDF Version&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Table of Contents&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#toc1&quot;&gt;1. Executive Summary&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#toc2&quot;&gt;2. Political, Technical, and Legal Context in Vietnam&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#toc2a&quot;&gt;A. Sensitive / Controversial Topics for Media Coverage&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#toc2b&quot;&gt;B. Internet Infrastructure and Access&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#toc2c&quot;&gt;C. Legal Background&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#toc3&quot;&gt;3. Testing Methodology&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#toc3a&quot;&gt;A. Methods&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#toc3b&quot;&gt;B. Results Analysis&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#toc3c&quot;&gt;C. Methods Specific to Vietnam&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#toc3d&quot;&gt;D. Topics Tested&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#toc4&quot;&gt;4. Results and Analysis&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#toc4a&quot;&gt;A. Summary&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#toc4b&quot;&gt;B. Global List Results&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#toc4c&quot;&gt;C. Vietnam-Specific Results&lt;/a&gt;studies/vietnam/&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#toc4d&quot;&gt;D. Filtering Methods&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#toc5&quot;&gt;5. Conclusion&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#app1&quot;&gt;Appendix 1&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#app2&quot;&gt;Appendix 2&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#app3&quot;&gt;Appendix 3&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#app4&quot;&gt;Appendix 4&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#app5&quot;&gt;Appendix 5&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;toc1&quot; id=&quot;toc1&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY &lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#1&quot;&gt;&lt;sup&gt;(1)&lt;/sup&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The Socialist Republic of Vietnam regulates  access to the Internet by its citizens extensively, through both  technical and legal means. This study by the OpenNet Initiative (ONI)  finds that the Vietnamese state attempts to block citizens from  accessing political and religious material deemed to be subversive  along various axes. The technical sophistication, breadth, and  effectiveness of Vietnam&#039;s filtering are increasing with time, and are  augmented by an ever-expanding set of legal regulations and  prohibitions that govern on-line activity. Vietnam purports to prevent  access to Internet sites primarily to safeguard against obscene or  sexually explicit content. However, the state&#039;s actual motives are far  more pragmatic: while it does not block any of the pornographic sites  ONI tested, it filters a significant fraction - in some cases, the  great majority - of sites with politically or religiously sensitive  material that could undermine Vietnam&#039;s one-party system. Vietnam&#039;s  Internet infrastructure and market are dynamic and fast-changing, but  it seems inescapable that the state&#039;s on-line information control will  deepen and grow.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Vietnam focuses particular effort on blocking  access to sites related to topics that challenge the state&#039;s political  orthodoxy, such as those treating political dissidents, political  democracy, or the proposed Vietnam Human Rights Act in the United  States Congress. Sites on topics related to domestic religious faiths,  such as Buddhism and Caodai, are also subject to blocking, though less  extensively. In nearly all cases, sites in the Vietnamese language are  far more likely to be blocked than sites in the English or French  languages. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Like many states in Southeast Asia and in other  regions of the world, Vietnam tries to leverage the Internet to provide  economic development and benefit, while simultaneously struggling to  limit access to content that might destabilize the Communist state.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#2&quot;&gt;2&lt;/a&gt; This tenuous balancing act finds its clearest expression in Vietnam&#039;s  2001 decree on management, provision, and use of Internet resources,  which requires that Internet &amp;quot;management capacity must be in line with  development requirements, while at the same time consistent measure  must be taken to prevent abuse of the Internet to affect the national  security and break national virtues and traditional good customs&amp;quot; to  achieve the &amp;quot;national cause of industrialization and modernization.&amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#3&quot;&gt;3&lt;/a&gt; Among other methods, the state monitors the use of cybercafés and  employs filtering of Internet content to control the information its  citizens can access online. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Vietnam&#039;s Internet filtering regime demonstrates  an ongoing struggle between the desire to increase Internet usage for  economic purposes and the desire to limit its effects politically, and  between the capabilities of filtering technology and the limitations of  bandwidth, ISP resources, and users&#039; tolerance. This system, more than  any other that ONI has studied, shows dramatic change over time and  bears careful monitoring of its development. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;toc2&quot; id=&quot;toc2&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;2. POLITICAL, TECHNICAL, AND LEGAL CONTEXT IN VIETNAM&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Internet filtering operates within a broader  context of legal regulation, technical architecture, and political and  social norms. This section explores these areas and their relevance to  Vietnam&#039;s Internet filtering regime. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;toc2a&quot; id=&quot;toc2a&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;A. Sensitive / Controversial Topics for Media Coverage&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Sensitive issues in Vietnam include corruption,  ethnic unrest, and political opposition, including topics related to  democracy or criticism of the state&#039;s single-party system.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#4&quot;&gt;4&lt;/a&gt; The Vietnamese government is concerned about allegations of corruption  after several high-profile incidents, including the firing of the  minister for agriculture and rural development in June 2004 for failing  to prevent a multi-million dollar (USD) corruption scandal in his  ministry,&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#5&quot;&gt;5&lt;/a&gt; allegations of corruption in the Vietnam Post and Telecommunications Corporation (VNPT, the state telco provider),&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#6&quot;&gt;6&lt;/a&gt;) and embezzlement in the Transportation Ministry that led to the minister&#039;s resignation and to the arrest of a deputy minister.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#7&quot;&gt;7&lt;/a&gt; The Prime Minister announced plans for an anti-corruption agency in late 2004.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#8&quot;&gt;8&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The state is also concerned about ethnic unrest,  particularly in rural areas. For example, Vietnamese authorities put  down a disturbance of thousands of Montagnards (members of a minority  ethnic group who are primarily Christians) in Gia Lai province in April  2004.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#9&quot;&gt;9&lt;/a&gt; The government then forced a Webmaster to close a site after he copied  an article about the violent protests; the student who ran the site  paid a fine and had to write a letter of self-criticism.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#10&quot;&gt;10&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Pornography, and other sexually explicit content,  is at least nominally a concern for state regulators. The head of a  provincial Post and Telematics Office cited statistics that 90% of  young Vietnamese Internet users had accessed pornography, and 26 of 28  cybercafés checked by officials had been used to access  sexually-oriented material.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#11&quot;&gt;11&lt;/a&gt; The Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Culture and Information noted  his concern about the spread of this content to new forms of  communication, including &amp;quot;sex chat, sex films on mobile phones, etc.&amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#12&quot;&gt;12&lt;/a&gt; He stated that the Internet &amp;quot;can also be a place where erroneous or  harmful news content [and] pornographic materials [are available]? If  online information is not controlled well, it can be a bad influence.&amp;quot; &lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#13&quot;&gt;13&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Vietnam worries particularly about the use of the  Internet to promote political reform, opposition groups, or viewpoints  critical of the state in areas such as international relations.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#14&quot;&gt;14&lt;/a&gt; Critiques of the state or its high-level leaders remain taboo.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#15&quot;&gt;15&lt;/a&gt; Amnesty International claims that at least 10 people have been arrested  for political activity using the Internet, with seven sentenced to  prison.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#16&quot;&gt;16&lt;/a&gt; For example, Nguyen Dan Que was sentenced to 30 months in jail for  writing and posting on the Internet an article about the lack of  freedom of information in Vietnam; he was released as part of an  amnesty in February 2005, but remains under surveillance.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#17&quot;&gt;17&lt;/a&gt; Dissident Le Chi Quang was sentenced to four years in prison for  posting an online article that criticized a border accord between China  and Vietnam.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#18&quot;&gt;18&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Finally, Vietnam is sensitive to criticism  regarding its record on human rights. For example, a blogger in Vietnam  posted a photo of a copy of the Asia Wall Street Journal purchased in  Ho Chi Minh City.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#19&quot;&gt;19&lt;/a&gt; The newspaper had been edited using old-fashioned means: the offending  text was blacked out. The obscured text noted widespread criticism of  Vietnam&#039;s human rights record and the state&#039;s designation as a &amp;quot;country  of particular concern&amp;quot; in the U.S. State Department&#039;s annual report on  religious freedoms worldwide.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;toc2b&quot; id=&quot;toc2b&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;B. Internet Infrastructure and Access&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Vietnam&#039;s Internet system is growing rapidly. Change  is constant, and it is difficult to describe the situation &amp;quot;on the  ground&amp;quot; with complete accuracy; indeed, even knowledgeable officials  who shared information with ONI often disagreed even about basic issues  such as the number of ISPs actually operating. The growth in user base  is clear. In 2004, Vietnam estimated it had 5.34 million Internet  users, including 1.44 million Internet subscribers;&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#20&quot;&gt;20&lt;/a&gt; by October 2005, Vietnam reportedly had 9.2 million users, including  2.5 million subscribers, creating an Internet penetration rate of 11.1%.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#21&quot;&gt;21&lt;/a&gt; Public, rather than home, Internet access is the norm in Vietnam. Most  users access the Internet from cybercafés, making control over this  venue important for the state.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#22&quot;&gt;22&lt;/a&gt; Cybercafé access is relatively inexpensive: in March 2006, for example,  using a computer with broadband Internet access for one hour in cafés  in Ho Chi Minh City cost roughly 6000 VND (approximately $0.40 USD). It  is common for businesses such as restaurants, art galleries, and bars  to offer Internet access for a fee. Many hotels advertise Internet  access as well. &lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#23&quot;&gt;23&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In addition, because the Vietnamese  telecommunications system is patterned on the French system, postal  offices are important providers of services such as telephone calls  (PSTN) and Internet access. Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) is an  increasingly popular means of communication; cybercafés in Ho Chi Minh  City, for example, often explicitly advertise VoIP services, and some  only provide VoIP (rather than a range of Internet services). Internet  access via satellite is not permitted, in part to maintain the monopoly  on satellite services enjoyed by VNPT. Pre-paid Internet access cards  are readily available and provide a measure of anonymity to users who  employ them.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#23&quot;&gt;23&lt;/a&gt; The state expressly works to reduce access costs &amp;quot;to quickly popularize  the Internet in Vietnam and further enhance the competitive edge of  Vietnamese enterprises in the process of international economic integration.&amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#24&quot;&gt;24&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Vietnamese online services, though, are still  nascent: a research group from the Ho Chi Minh City University of  Natural Sciences is working to create a Vietnamese search engine based  on keywords, as there are few search engines currently available to  Vietnamese users.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#25&quot;&gt;25&lt;/a&gt; Vietnam has adopted TCVN 6909:2001 as the official method of representing Vietnamese 16-bit characters online,&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#26&quot;&gt;26&lt;/a&gt; though older character sets such as VIQR and Windows Vietnam cp1258 may also be used.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#27&quot;&gt;27&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Vietnam controls the allocation of domain names  under the country code top-level domain (ccTLD) .VN through the Vietnam  Internet Center (VNNIC).&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#28&quot;&gt;28&lt;/a&gt; As of mid-July 2005, the .VN domain reportedly had 11,533 registered  domains, with about 400-600 new .VN domain names being registered each  day.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#29&quot;&gt;29&lt;/a&gt; Vietnam is also planning to implement a state-controlled Vietnamese-language second-level domain,&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#30&quot;&gt;30&lt;/a&gt; presumably similar in concept to the new Chinese-language top-level domains set up by China.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#31&quot;&gt;31&lt;/a&gt; Blogging remains quite limited in Vietnam, and most bloggers who post  from inside the state do so in English. Informal discussions with  bloggers in Vietnam indicate that some users are concerned about  repercussions if they post in Vietnamese to a blog, even about less  sensitive topics.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;State regulation determines how Internet  connectivity in Vietnam is organized. At the edge of the network,  Internet agents, such as cybercafés, connect to the Internet service  provider (ISP) with which they have signed their agency contract.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#32&quot;&gt;32&lt;/a&gt; ISPs may connect with each other and with Internet exchange points  (IXPs), except that private ISPs may not connect with each other in  peering arrangements.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#33&quot;&gt;33&lt;/a&gt; Online service providers (OSPs) and Internet content providers (ICPs) may connect to ISPs and IXPs. &lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#34&quot;&gt;34&lt;/a&gt; IXPs can connect with each other (peering) and with the international Internet.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#35&quot;&gt;35&lt;/a&gt; Thus, connectivity is managed so that only IXPs may maintain connections with the wider Internet.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#36&quot;&gt;36&lt;/a&gt; ISPs must obtain upstream access by leasing it from IXPs. This likely  makes filtering Internet content easier for Vietnam by limiting  external access points that must be controlled. In the past, all IXPs  were required to purchase physical connectivity from Vietnam Telecom  International (VTI). Currently, IXPs can theoretically maintain  independent connections to the international Internet, but it is not  clear how many do so in practice. Foreign-owned entities that can  purchase VSAT connections can obtain unfiltered Internet access, but  this is relatively rare in Vietnam, and largely irrelevant for  Vietnamese Internet users. Vietnam&#039;s network topology is in constant  flux; our analysis applies to the infrastructure as it existed at the  time of our testing.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Vietnam&#039;s primary, state-owned gateway, Viet Nam Data Communications Co. (VDC),&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#37&quot;&gt;37&lt;/a&gt; is owned by Vietnam Posts and Telecommunications Group.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#38&quot;&gt;38&lt;/a&gt; (VDC was previously owned by the Vietnam Posts and Telecommunications  Corporation, or VNPT, which also became part of the Vietnam Post and  Telecommunications Group after a reorganization approved in March 2005  and implemented in January 2006.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#39&quot;&gt;39&lt;/a&gt; The reorganization appears to contemplate splitting VNPT into three  different Telecommunications Corporations divided by geographic region.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#40&quot;&gt;40&lt;/a&gt; The Group is now known as VNPT.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#41&quot;&gt;41&lt;/a&gt;)  A Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications official stated that there  are three international gateways, with VNPT / VDC, Viettel, and FPT  each controlling one.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#42&quot;&gt;42&lt;/a&gt;Officials  at those companies, however, indicate that in practice VNPT / VDC has  three gateways, Viettel has three, and FPT has four.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#43&quot;&gt;43&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Formally, the Ministry of Posts and  Telecommunications lists 13 Internet access services providers (IASPs),  six IXPs, and 11 OSPs as licensed in Vietnam.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#44&quot;&gt;44&lt;/a&gt; However, ONI research indicates that entities with the legal right to  offer services in Vietnam may not be yet doing so, and knowledgeable  sources disagree about the precise number of ISPs actually operating.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;div align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
&lt;table border=&quot;1&quot; bordercolor=&quot;#000000&quot; cellpadding=&quot;2&quot; cellspacing=&quot;2&quot; width=&quot;500&quot;&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Type of Entity&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Company&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td rowspan=&quot;13&quot; valign=&quot;top&quot; width=&quot;50%&quot;&gt;Internet Access Service Provider (IASP)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;VNPT&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
        &lt;!--
&lt;td&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;p&gt;--&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;td&gt;FPT&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
        &lt;!--
&lt;td&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;p&gt;--&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Viettel Corp.&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
        &lt;!--
&lt;td&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;p&gt;--&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Saigon Posts and Telecommunications Service Corp. (SPT) [Saigon Net]&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
        &lt;!--
&lt;td&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;p&gt;--&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Hanoi Telecom Co.&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
        &lt;!--
&lt;td&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;p&gt;--&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Internet Service Stock Co. (OIC)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
        &lt;!--
&lt;td&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;p&gt;--&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;td&gt;TIE Trade Import Export Co. (TIENET)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
        &lt;!--
&lt;td&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;p&gt;--&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;td&gt;ELINCO&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
        &lt;!--
&lt;td&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;p&gt;--&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;td&gt;TECHCOM&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
        &lt;!--
&lt;td&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;p&gt;--&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Quality Technology Network Corp. (QTNET)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
        &lt;!--
&lt;td&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;p&gt;--&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Thanh Tam Stock Co.&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
        &lt;!--
&lt;td&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;p&gt;--&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Netnam Co.&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
        &lt;!--
&lt;td&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;p&gt;--&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Viet Khang Co. (XVNET)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot;&gt; &lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td rowspan=&quot;6&quot; valign=&quot;top&quot; width=&quot;50%&quot;&gt;Internet Exchange Providers (IXP)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;VNPT&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#45&quot;&gt;45&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
        &lt;!--
&lt;td&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;p&gt;--&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;td&gt;FPT&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
        &lt;!--
&lt;td&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;p&gt;--&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Viettel&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
        &lt;!--
&lt;td&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;p&gt;--&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;td&gt;SPT&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
        &lt;!--
&lt;td&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;p&gt;--&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Hanoi Telecom Co.&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
        &lt;!--
&lt;td&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;p&gt;--&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Electric Telecommunication Co.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#46&quot;&gt;46&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot;&gt; &lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td rowspan=&quot;11&quot; valign=&quot;top&quot; width=&quot;50%&quot;&gt;Online Service Provider (OSP)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;VNPT&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
        &lt;!--
&lt;td&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;p&gt;--&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;td&gt;FPT&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
        &lt;!--
&lt;td&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;p&gt;--&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Viettel&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
        &lt;!--
&lt;td&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;p&gt;--&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;td&gt;SPT&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
        &lt;!--
&lt;td&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;p&gt;--&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Hanoi Telecom&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
        &lt;!--
&lt;td&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;p&gt;--&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;td&gt;OIC&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
        &lt;!--
&lt;td&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;p&gt;--&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;td&gt;TIENET&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
        &lt;!--
&lt;td&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;p&gt;--&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;td&gt;ELINCO&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
        &lt;!--
&lt;td&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;p&gt;--&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;td&gt;TECHCOM&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
        &lt;!--
&lt;td&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;p&gt;--&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;td&gt;QTNET&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
        &lt;!--
&lt;td&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;p&gt;--&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Thanh Tam&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;
&lt;p&gt;  Figure 1 ? Licensed Internet Entities
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In reality, only six ISPs have sufficient market  share to be considered viable. Indeed, VNNIC permits only eight  entities to operate under the .VN domain, and only seven IASPs offer  access to subscribers.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#47&quot;&gt;47&lt;/a&gt; The ISPs with significant market share are listed in the chart below.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;div align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
&lt;table border=&quot;1&quot; bordercolor=&quot;#000000&quot; cellpadding=&quot;2&quot; cellspacing=&quot;2&quot; width=&quot;500&quot;&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;ISP&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;URL&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Market Share&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#48&quot;&gt;48&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td width=&quot;50%&quot;&gt;VNPT&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.vnpt.com.vn/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;http://www.vnpt.com.vn/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;44.34%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td width=&quot;50%&quot;&gt;Vietnamese Corporation for Financing and Promoting Technology (FPT)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.fpt.vn/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;http://www.fpt.vn/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
          &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.hcm.fpt.vn/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;http://www.hcm.fpt.vn/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;28.62%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td width=&quot;50%&quot;&gt;Viettel&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.vietel.com.vn/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;http://www.vietel.com.vn/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;13.67%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td width=&quot;50%&quot;&gt;Saigon Net&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.saigonnet.vn/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;http://www.saigonnet.vn/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
          &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.saigonpostel.com.vn/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;http://www.saigonpostel.com.vn/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;6.44%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td valign=&quot;top&quot; width=&quot;50%&quot;&gt;Netnam&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.netnam.vn/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;http://www.netnam.vn/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
          &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.netnam.vn/services.htm&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;http://www.netnam.vn/services.htm&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;5.16%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;
&lt;p&gt;  Figure 2 ? List of Major Vietnam ISPs
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ONI was able to obtain data on how certain of Vietnam&#039;s ISPs obtain international Internet access:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;div align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
&lt;table border=&quot;1&quot; bordercolor=&quot;#000000&quot; cellpadding=&quot;2&quot; cellspacing=&quot;2&quot; width=&quot;500&quot;&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;ISP&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;International Access (Upstream) Provider(s)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td width=&quot;25%&quot;&gt;VDC / VNPT&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width=&quot;75%&quot;&gt;Singtel, Kornet, Chunghwa Telecom, Malaysia Telecom, NTT, Reach, KDD, ChinaNet, Fusion&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td width=&quot;25%&quot;&gt;Viettel&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Hutchinson, Dacom, SingTel, VSAT&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td width=&quot;25%&quot;&gt;FPT&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Hutchinson, Reach&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td width=&quot;25%&quot;&gt;ETC&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Kornet&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td width=&quot;25%&quot;&gt;SPT&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Reach&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;
&lt;p&gt;  Figure 3 ? Upstream Access Providers to Vietnamese ISPs
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The cost of upstream bandwidth is considerable  for Vietnamese ISPs, accounting for as much as 80% of their input  costs. Moreover, bandwidth may not be reliable; the deputy minister of  the MCI admitted that some domestic Web content providers host their  sites on servers abroad because they &amp;quot;have transmission lines of higher  quality.&amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#49&quot;&gt;49&lt;/a&gt; In total, Vietnam leases roughly 2200 Mbps of international line  capacity. This international leased line capacity is allocated as  follows:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;div align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
&lt;table border=&quot;1&quot; bordercolor=&quot;#000000&quot; cellpadding=&quot;2&quot; cellspacing=&quot;2&quot; width=&quot;500&quot;&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;ISP&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Share of International Leased Line Bandwidth&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td width=&quot;25%&quot;&gt;VNPT&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td width=&quot;75%&quot;&gt;76.32%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td width=&quot;25%&quot;&gt;FPT&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;13.96%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td width=&quot;25%&quot;&gt;Viettel&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;9.46%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td width=&quot;25%&quot;&gt;SPT&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;.18%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td width=&quot;25%&quot;&gt;ETC&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;.09%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;
&lt;p&gt;  Figure 4 ? ISP Shares of International Bandwidth
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;p&gt;All ISPs in Vietnam are either state-owned  enterprises or entities that have been &amp;quot;equitized&amp;quot; (a process where a  state-owned enterprise issues shares to the state, to management, and  to workers, but not to the private market), except for OCI, which is  privately owned.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#50&quot;&gt;50&lt;/a&gt; For example, FPT was formerly a state-owned enterprise, but was  equitized. ONI research indicates that state-owned, equitized, and  private ISPs face the same fees ? there is no internal discrimination  among ISPs by the state. While any Vietnamese firm can operate as an  ISP, only companies that are state-owned can be IASPs or IXPs.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#51&quot;&gt;51&lt;/a&gt; Majority ownership of telecommunications entities in Vietnam by foreign  investors is not permitted. This limitation makes control over Internet  content easier to achieve for Vietnam.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;toc2c&quot; id=&quot;toc2c&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;C. Legal Background&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;1. General Media Regulation&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Like most Communist countries, Vietnam nominally  guarantees freedom of speech, of the press, and of assembly through  constitutional provisions, but state security laws and other  regulations trump or eliminate these formal protections (commonly  referred to as the &amp;quot;national security override&amp;quot;). Thus, Article 69 of  the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam states that a  &amp;quot;citizen shall enjoy freedom of opinion and speech, freedom of the  press, the right to be informed, and the right to assemble, form  associations and hold demonstrations in accord with provisions of the  law.&amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#52&quot;&gt;52&lt;/a&gt; However, media in Vietnam are tightly controlled by the state.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#53&quot;&gt;53&lt;/a&gt; Vietnamese media are state-owned, and regulated by the Ministry of Culture and Information (MCI).&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#54&quot;&gt;54&lt;/a&gt; The MCI meets with journalists to instruct them on covering stories to ensure that the media follow the dictates of the state.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#55&quot;&gt;55&lt;/a&gt; In telecommunications, the Ministry of Posts and Telematics primarily sets policy and regulates.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#56&quot;&gt;56&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Vietnam is reportedly tightening its press  controls. Deutsche Press Agentur states that a new Decree on Cultural  and Information Activities, set to take effect July 1, 2006, punishes  &amp;quot;denying revolutionary achievements,&amp;quot; publishing stories that employ  anonymous sources, disseminating reactionary ideology, refusing to  permit someone interviewed for a story to read it before publication,  or revealing state secrets of any type.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#57&quot;&gt;57&lt;/a&gt; The violations can be punished with fines of up to 30 million dong (roughly $2,000 U.S.).&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#58&quot;&gt;58&lt;/a&gt; In addition, the new decree reportedly mandates that journalists submit articles for review before they can be published.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#59&quot;&gt;59&lt;/a&gt; The new, stricter press controls are apparently a state response to  investigative journalism that has probed health issues, poverty, and  governmental corruption, including an embezzlement scandal that led to  the resignation of the minister of transportation and the arrest of the  deputy minister.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#60&quot;&gt;60&lt;/a&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;2. Internet Access Regulation&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Legal regulation of the Internet in Vietnam occurs at several levels of government.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#61&quot;&gt;61&lt;/a&gt; Most broadly, Vietnam&#039;s National Assembly has adopted a number of decisions and decrees on information technology issues.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#62&quot;&gt;62&lt;/a&gt; Next, several ministries have authority to promulgate decisions affecting the Internet, including the Ministry of Finance,&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#63&quot;&gt;63&lt;/a&gt; the Ministry of Post and Telematics (MPT),&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#64&quot;&gt;64&lt;/a&gt; and the Ministry of Culture and Information (MCI).&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#65&quot;&gt;65&lt;/a&gt; These ministries often collaborate on Internet regulation, including a  circular regarding management of Internet agencies (such as cybercafés)  promulgated in July 2005 that involved the MPT, MCI, Ministry of Public  Security, and Ministry of Planning and Investment.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#66&quot;&gt;66&lt;/a&gt; In addition, provinces and cities regulate Internet services, particularly when they perceive a void in national regulation.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#67&quot;&gt;67&lt;/a&gt; Finally, the Vietnam Posts and Telecommunications Group (VNPT) makes  decisions through its management that govern day-to-day functioning of  the Internet infrastructure.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#68&quot;&gt;68&lt;/a&gt; Thus, control over Internet access and content can occur through  national policymaking, ministerial decisions, or through rules created  by the management of the backbone provider.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;At the formal level, the state divides regulatory responsibilities among a number of ministries: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;div align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
&lt;table border=&quot;1&quot; bordercolor=&quot;#000000&quot; cellpadding=&quot;2&quot; cellspacing=&quot;2&quot; width=&quot;500&quot;&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Ministry&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Regulatory Competence&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td valign=&quot;top&quot; width=&quot;50%&quot;&gt;Ministry of Posts and Telematics (MPT)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Regulates  state management of the Internet; coordinates with ministries, bodies  at the ministerial level, state agencies, and People&#039;s Committees of  centrally-run cities and provinces; represents Vietnam in international  Internet activities;&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#69&quot;&gt;69&lt;/a&gt; creates Internet development policies and planning; manages dialing and  connection services; works with the state&#039;s Encryption Department to  manage authentication. &lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#70&quot;&gt;70&lt;/a&gt; &lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td valign=&quot;top&quot; width=&quot;50%&quot;&gt;Ministry of Science, Technology, and Environment&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Manages research and development of advanced Internet technologies.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#71&quot;&gt;71&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td valign=&quot;top&quot; width=&quot;50%&quot;&gt;Ministry of Culture and Information (MCI)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Manages  information on the Internet, including implementing regulations for  newspaper, publication, and e-news distribution online.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#72&quot;&gt;72&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td valign=&quot;top&quot; width=&quot;50%&quot;&gt;Ministry of Public Security&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Ensures national security related to Internet activity and applies &amp;quot;technical measures&amp;quot; to manage information security online.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#73&quot;&gt;73&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td valign=&quot;top&quot; width=&quot;50%&quot;&gt;Ministry of Finance&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Works  with related branches of the state to create a financial support system  for reduced Internet access charges for entities such as educational,  health care, and software development organizations.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#74&quot;&gt;74&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td valign=&quot;top&quot; width=&quot;50%&quot;&gt;Ministry of Planning and Investment&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Oversees granting and withdrawal of certificates for entities such as Internet agency businesses.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#75&quot;&gt;75&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td valign=&quot;top&quot; width=&quot;50%&quot;&gt;Various ministries, ministerial-level bodies, and state agencies&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Are responsible for Internet application services in their area of regulation, including defining which services are forbidden.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#76&quot;&gt;76&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td valign=&quot;top&quot; width=&quot;50%&quot;&gt;People&#039;s Committees&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Manage the implementation of Internet regulations in their cities and provinces in coordination with other state entities.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#77&quot;&gt;77&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Figure 5 ? Vietnam&#039;s Ministries and Their Regulatory Areas
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Vietnam&#039;s most recent Internet access regulation  derives from a joint circular issued by the MPT, MCI, Ministry of  Public Security, and Ministry of Planning on July 14, 2005 that  addresses both on-line access and content.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#78&quot;&gt;78&lt;/a&gt; The circular applies to Internet agents (Vietnamese individuals and  organizations providing Internet access or on-line services), ISPs, and  telecommunications online service providers.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#79&quot;&gt;79&lt;/a&gt; It bans using circumvention tools to bypass filtering, aiding others to do so, and accessing foreign ISPs via direct dial-up.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#80&quot;&gt;80&lt;/a&gt; Entities offering Internet access or on-line services to users must  hold Internet agency registration certificates and must have entered  into an agency contract with an ISP.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#81&quot;&gt;81&lt;/a&gt; The circular sets forth conditions that Internet agency businesses must  meet to operate, such as ensuring that computer monitors can be  monitored easily by managers.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#82&quot;&gt;82&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The circular also sets forth measures to control  users&#039; activities while on-line. Internet agency businesses must  install centralized server software to ensure &amp;quot;information security&amp;quot; ?  to filter undesirable Web sites.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#83&quot;&gt;83&lt;/a&gt; Businesses must post prohibitions and regulations on Internet use in a conspicuous place.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#84&quot;&gt;84&lt;/a&gt; Employees and owners of these businesses are responsible for inspecting  users&#039; activities and guiding them to comply with applicable  regulations, and to prevent, detect, and stop any violations.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#85&quot;&gt;85&lt;/a&gt; Internet agency enterprises must compile information on their  customers, including full names, addresses, identity card or passport  numbers, the computer used by each customer, and the length of time  they used the PC.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#86&quot;&gt;86&lt;/a&gt; Such information must be preserved, and shared with state agencies upon request.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#87&quot;&gt;87&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
These businesses must also use technical methods  to control Internet users&#039; activities. They must install and use  software to prevent users from accessing Web sites with prohibited  material.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#88&quot;&gt;88&lt;/a&gt; The firms are required to employ software that records which sites  users visit, what applications they use (for example, e-mail or chat),  and how long they stay on-line.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#89&quot;&gt;89&lt;/a&gt; The circular requires businesses to store this information for 30 days,  and contemplates that they will transmit it to state agencies  responsible for information security.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#90&quot;&gt;90&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The circular also imposes obligations upon  customers who access the Internet through these businesses. For  example, they must not use software that allows them to illegally  access or use Internet services (such as circumvention tools).&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#91&quot;&gt;91&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ISPs and Internet agents can be inspected by the  relevant state agencies; if they violate applicable regulations, they  face penalties ranging from fines to termination of service contracts  and licenses to potential criminal liability.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#92&quot;&gt;92&lt;/a&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Vietnam&#039;s legal regulation of Internet access is  thus multi-layered and complex; while these rules may not be  consistently implemented and enforced, they provide the state with  considerable authority and discretion to control how citizens get  on-line. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;3. Internet Content Regulation&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Vietnam seeks to ensure that Internet use supports  the state&#039;s economic development while not threatening its one-party  political system. The MPT reiterated these goals in a set of  regulations promulgated in August 2005, which emphasized that it is  unlawful to use Internet resources to oppose the state; to destabilize  Vietnam&#039;s security, economy, or social order; to infringe  organizations&#039; or individuals&#039; rights; or to interfere with the state&#039;s  Domain Name System (DNS) servers.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#93&quot;&gt;93&lt;/a&gt; In addition, the decision makes clear that Internet operations  supporting the state, such as those of the Communist Party or  government agencies, have priority in resource allocation.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#94&quot;&gt;94&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Vietnam&#039;s approach to Internet content control is  expressly multi-modal; the Deputy Minister of Culture and Industry  stated that the state &amp;quot;should manage content in three ways: laws,  techniques and education.&amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#95&quot;&gt;95&lt;/a&gt; The state has extensive legal regulation of Internet content and of the entities that provide it.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#96&quot;&gt;96&lt;/a&gt; Content providers in Vietnam must not host material that &amp;quot;cause[s]  harms to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the  Socialist Republic of Vietnam . . . [or] incite[s] people to oppose the  State of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam or to destroy the  entire-population great unity bloc.&amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#97&quot;&gt;97&lt;/a&gt; (Among other entities, this regulation applies to on-line newspapers.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#98&quot;&gt;98&lt;/a&gt;)  Likewise, they may not host content that &amp;quot;instigate[s] violence,  propagate[s] aggressive wars, provoke[s] hostilities among  nationalities and peoples of different countries, nor incite[s]  obscenity, depraved life or crimes,&amp;quot; or &amp;quot;disclose[s] the State&#039;s  secrets, military, security, economic and diplomatic secrets as well as  other secrets prescribed by the legislation of the Socialist Republic  of Vietnam.&amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#99&quot;&gt;99&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The major guiding legal instrument regulating the  Internet in Vietnam is the state&#039;s decree of Aug. 23, 2001 on Internet  management, provision, and use.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#100&quot;&gt;100&lt;/a&gt; It covers all domestic and foreign individuals and organizations involved in Internet activity in Vietnam.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#101&quot;&gt;101&lt;/a&gt; The decree seeks to balance maintaining security and cultural values  with developing scientific, research, educational, health-related,  governmental, and software development uses of the Internet.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#102&quot;&gt;102&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the decree, the state mandated that  information stored on, sent over, or retrieved from the Internet comply  with Vietnam&#039;s Press Law, Publication Law, Ordinance Protecting State  Secrets, and other laws, such as intellectual property protections.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#103&quot;&gt;103&lt;/a&gt; Entities are responsible legally not only for information they create  or send, but also information they store ? placing liability on  intermediaries such as ISPs as well as authors.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#104&quot;&gt;104&lt;/a&gt; The state regulates the use of encryption on the Internet.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#105&quot;&gt;105&lt;/a&gt; Article 11 of the decree forbids damaging computer equipment services  to prevent access to and use of Internet services; stealing and using  passwords, codes, cryptographic keys, and private information from  individuals or organizations; using the Internet &amp;quot;to fight against the  Socialist Republic of Vietnam&amp;quot;; &amp;quot;causing chaos and security disorder&amp;quot;;  &amp;quot;degrading national virtues and traditional good customs&amp;quot;; and  &amp;quot;committing other violations of the laws.&amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#106&quot;&gt;106&lt;/a&gt; Furthermore, Vietnamese users may not use international direct telephone dial connections to access the Internet.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#107&quot;&gt;107&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
The decree sets forth a schedule of fines for  violations of Internet rules, including accessing the Internet  unlawfully and using the Internet to spread pornographic images.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#108&quot;&gt;108&lt;/a&gt; Perhaps most important, users &amp;quot;who take advantage of the Internet to  fight against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, cause chaos or  security disorder[, or commit] other serious violations that show signs  of crimes will be subject to criminal penalties in accordance with the  law.&amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#109&quot;&gt;109&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Under the 2001 decree, ICPs must obtain licenses  from the Ministry of Culture and Information (MCI), and must follow the  decree, MCI regulations on distribution of newspapers and publications  online, and regulations on providing e-news on the Internet.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#110&quot;&gt;110&lt;/a&gt; ISPs and IXPs must obtain licenses from the MPT, and OSPs are regulated by the state agency responsible for that OSP&#039;s field.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#111&quot;&gt;111&lt;/a&gt; MPT regulations that implement the 2001 decree permit private ISPs to  &amp;quot;provide accessibility to all Internet services at the request of  members, except for service forbidden or not yet allowed to be  provided, as well as Internet addresses forbidden to access as  regulated and announced by State management agencies.&amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#112&quot;&gt;112&lt;/a&gt; This regulation forbids private ISPs from permitting access to filtered material.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;One interesting result of the state&#039;s  organization under the August 2001 decree is that regulatory  responsibility for Internet material is divided along subject matter  lines in Vietnam. While the Ministry of Culture and Information focuses  on sexually explicit, superstitious, or violent content, the Ministry  of Public Security monitors customers who access politically sensitive  sites.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#113&quot;&gt;113&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Vietnam has recently moved to tighten its  regulatory controls over the Internet. The state moved to clamp down on  entities providing Internet information. Under regulations promulgated  in 2002, domestic Web content providers must obtain approval and a  license from the Ministry of Culture and Information.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#114&quot;&gt;114&lt;/a&gt; The Ministry of Public Security established a new police force &amp;quot;to  monitor and suppress web sites carrying materials considered as crimes  on the Internet&amp;quot; in August 2004.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#115&quot;&gt;115&lt;/a&gt; The new unit focuses on tracing sites that violate Vietnamese Internet laws.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#116&quot;&gt;116&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Vietnam has also sought to address security  concerns related to Internet resources. In August 2005, the Minister of  Posts and Telematics issued a decision on &amp;quot;The Management and Use of  Internet Resources.&amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#117&quot;&gt;117&lt;/a&gt; This decision, which replaces a similar decision promulgated in 2003,  regulates Internet resources such as IP addresses and domain names, and  cautions that &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;It is strictly prohibited to use  Internet resources for purposes of opposing the State of the Socialist  Republic of Vietnam, disturbing security, economy, social order and  safety, undermining the nation&#039;s fine tradition and custom, infringing  upon the legitimate rights and interests of organizations and  individuals and illegally obstructing the operations of the national  system of domain name system (DNS) servers.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#118&quot;&gt;118&lt;/a&gt; &lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Recently, the state moved to increase  dramatically its supervision of cybercafés and other access points. In  May 2004, Vietnam ordered its organizations to &amp;quot;tighten state  management to prevent the exploitation and the circulation of bad and  poisonous information on the Internet,&amp;quot; instructing local authorities  to inspect cybercafés and Web sites frequently. &lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#119&quot;&gt;119&lt;/a&gt; For example, authorities reprimanded Hanoi cybercafé owners who allowed  users to view forbidden Web sites, such as those containing  pornography, after an investigation by the capitol&#039;s Culture and  Information Department.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#120&quot;&gt;120&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Ministry of Posts and Telematics issued a  directive on May 7, 2004 &amp;quot;on intensifying the assurance of safety and  security for post, telecommunication and Internet information in the  new situation.&amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#121&quot;&gt;121&lt;/a&gt; This directive responded to the concern that &amp;quot;the hostile forces are  increasingly taking advantage of postal, telecommunication and Internet  services, to infringe upon our national security and undermine our  social order and safety.&amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#122&quot;&gt;122&lt;/a&gt; It directed the MPT to implement information security and required  &amp;quot;Postal, telecommunication and internet enterprises [to] coordinate  with the local police in drawing up action plans to cope with violent  incidents and riots undermining social safety and order or infringing  upon national security.&amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#123&quot;&gt;123&lt;/a&gt; In addition, these entities were required to coordinate efforts with  the Ministry of Public Security to block or withdraw services from  entities using them to provoke &amp;quot;violence or riots.&amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#124&quot;&gt;124&lt;/a&gt; The directive requires that: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;Postal, telecommunication and  internet enterprises shall intensify examination and close supervision  of activities of internet and telecommunication service agents;  propagate and guide the agents&#039; owners to firmly grasp the State&#039;s  regulations on assurance of information safety and security and to  strictly observe the regulations on provision of postal,  telecommunication and internet services; [and] to supply fully data as  requested so that the police agencies take necessary measures to  protect national security and social safety and order.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#125&quot;&gt;125&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In July 2004, the Ministry issued a directive increasing control over Internet agents.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#126&quot;&gt;126&lt;/a&gt; The term &amp;quot;Internet agent&amp;quot; is defined in the August 2001 decree as the  &amp;quot;Vietnam-based organizations and individuals who, on behalf of ISPs and  PSPs, provide Internet dialing and Internet application services to  users via agent contracts to enjoy[ing] commissions.&amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#127&quot;&gt;127&lt;/a&gt; While lauding the increased access provided by &amp;quot;public Internet agents&amp;quot;  (such as cybercafés), the MPT decried those that allowed customers  &amp;quot;arbitrarily [to] access unhealthy information which may cause harms to  the political security, social order and safety and national cultural  identity of Vietnam.&amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#128&quot;&gt;128&lt;/a&gt; Thus, the Ministry required owners of such agents to post the  regulations on Internet services in their establishments, guide users  in complying with the regulations, and stop known violations by users  of the rules.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#129&quot;&gt;129&lt;/a&gt; ISPs and telecommunications providers were expressly permitted to  suspend service to public Internet agents who facilitated or  intentionally hid users&#039; actions in &amp;quot;accessing electronic news pages or  propagating or spreading documents with depraved or obscene contents,  [or] violating the fine customs and traditions or infringing upon the  national security.&amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#130&quot;&gt;130&lt;/a&gt; Furthermore, providers became responsible for inspecting and  supervising agents in carrying out the terms of their contracts. If the  provider detected a cybercafé violating contractual provisions, the ISP  would have to stop providing service to the café and to inform the  local Post and Telematics Department in writing.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#131&quot;&gt;131&lt;/a&gt; Providers with insufficient management and oversight of agents would  face suspension of their ability to enter into new agent contracts.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#132&quot;&gt;132&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Vietnam augmented this directive one year later  with a joint circular promulgated by the MPT, MCI, Ministry of Public  Security, and the Ministry of Planning and Investment.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#133&quot;&gt;133&lt;/a&gt; Many of the circular&#039;s provisions recapitulate or expand upon items set  forth in the 2004 directive. The circular prohibits storing military,  economic, security, or other secrets on Internet-connected computers,  using the Internet to oppose the Vietnamese state or disturb security,  or creating Web sites or on-line forums to enable others to perform  such prohibited activities.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#134&quot;&gt;134&lt;/a&gt; Users are responsible for content they create on or transmit through the Internet.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#135&quot;&gt;135&lt;/a&gt; They must not transmit depraved or obscene information or images,  &amp;quot;offend fine traditions and custom,&amp;quot; oppose the Vietnamese state  disturb social order, or use software to access and use Internet  services unlawfully through their Internet activities.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#136&quot;&gt;136&lt;/a&gt; Moreover, the regulations deputize users as detectives in discovering  prohibited material on-line; if a user finds a Web site or service with  content that opposes the Vietnamese state, or disturbs social order and  security, she is responsible for informing promptly the municipal or  provincial Culture and Information Services (a department of the MCI).&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#137&quot;&gt;137&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Recently, Vietnamese authorities further  increased monitoring of cybercafé usage. The Ministry of Culture and  Information promulgated an instruction in August 2004 requiring  cybercafés to track all Web sites their customers visit, along with the  credit card or ID card numbers of customers who visit inappropriate  sites, and to make this information available to its inspectors.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#138&quot;&gt;138&lt;/a&gt; However, ONI research inside Vietnam demonstrates that enforcement of  ID regulations varies greatly in different locations and is, for  example, largely ignored in cities such as Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi.  During ONI&#039;s in-country research, there were no instances of cybercafé  users being asked or required to present identification, and the ONI  researcher did not observe any use of surveillance cameras or equipment  to monitor Internet usage. While most cafés posted the Internet café  regulations (N?i Qui Ph?ng M?y) on their walls, users did not appear to  read or pay attention to them. The regulations comprise the following:&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#139&quot;&gt;139&lt;/a&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Internet Service Regulations:&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#140&quot;&gt;140&lt;/a&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ol&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Do not act in an unruly manner, do not sabotage  the equipment, and do not distort, alter or destroy the Internet  programs on the computers.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Do not create and purposely spread viruses on the Internet.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Do not use the software to search and use illegal services provided on the Internet.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Do not steal and use passwords or private  documents belonging to organizations and individuals, or distribute  them for use to others.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Do not use the Internet to threaten, blackmail and damage the reputation of others.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Do not use the Internet to distribute materials against the interests of the government or the national security of Vietnam.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Do not use the Internet to post pornographic  materials and pictures contrary to Vietnamese morals, and do not put  online materials that are in violation of the publishing law.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Do not contact foreign companies providing Internet services by using dial-up direct phone calls.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Do not use any Internet programs currently prohibited or not yet authorized for use in Vietnam.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The size of partitions between computers varied  from substantial to non-existent, and some cafés posted small signs (in  English) on computer monitors asking users not to visit pornographic  Web sites.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#141&quot;&gt;141&lt;/a&gt; Fines for café owners were increased to a maximum of 30 million dong (U.S. $1900).&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#142&quot;&gt;142&lt;/a&gt; State officials claimed that their monitoring of cybercafés was difficult due to a lack of equipment and technology expertise.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#143&quot;&gt;143&lt;/a&gt; In September 2004, authorities shut down at least 65 cybercafés in Ho  Chi Minh City because patrons visited pornographic and political  opposition Web sites.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#144&quot;&gt;144&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In March 2005, the MCI began &amp;quot;inspecting&amp;quot; the  approximately seventy state-run online newspapers and informational  websites, and more than 2,500 other news and informational websites,  under the MCI&#039;s control.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#145&quot;&gt;145&lt;/a&gt; The goal of the inspection was to locate those news and information websites that &amp;quot;operate outside the rules.&amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#146&quot;&gt;146&lt;/a&gt; The Deputy Minister of the MCI admitted to the state-run Internet news  service VietnamNet that no single agency can effectively police all the  online news and information websites in Vietnam.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#147&quot;&gt;147&lt;/a&gt; He suggested that more regulations are needed to &amp;quot;govern the control  and provision of information on the Internet,&amp;quot; including &amp;quot;regulations  that clearly define the conception of an online newspaper, information  websites and ICPs.&amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#148&quot;&gt;148&lt;/a&gt; In addition, he called for the law to provide broader power to impose  sanctions on a range of online activities: &amp;quot;While we focus on  violations of public Internet agents, a series of new violations have  appeared, for example chat sex, sex films on mobile phones, etc.&amp;quot;&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#149&quot;&gt;149&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Thus, the trend in Vietnam is towards increased  regulation of Internet content, resources, and access. Vietnamese  authorities have launched a crackdown on what they consider unlawful  usage of the Internet in an effort to prevent citizens from accessing  material that might undermine its control. Backed up by explicit  regulations, these controls are distributed across multiple government  ministries and extend into the operations of major ISPs, cybercafés,  and Web site operators.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;a name=&quot;toc3&quot; id=&quot;toc3&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;3. TESTING METHODOLOGY&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;toc3a&quot; id=&quot;toc3a&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;A. Methods&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ONI performs technical testing across multiple  levels of access at multiple time intervals in a number of regions  around the world. The team analyzes results within the contextual  framework of the target state&#039;s filtering technology, law, and  regulations. To obtain meaningful, accurate results we seek to: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;generate lists of domain names and URLs that  have been or are likely to be blocked, based upon background research  into relevant social and political issues in Vietnam;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;enumerate ISPs and national routing topography;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;determine the type, location, and behavior of the filtering technology;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;deploy network interrogation and enumeration software at multiple access points; and,&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;conduct a thorough statistical analysis of results.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Determining which URLs to test is a vital  component of our research, as it reveals the filtering system&#039;s  technical capacity and content areas subject to blocking. ONI employs  three types of lists: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;a list of &amp;quot;high impact&amp;quot; sites reported to be  blocked or likely to be blocked in the state due to their content (for  example, political opposition);&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;a &amp;quot;global list&amp;quot; containing a control list of  manually categorized Web sites reflecting a range of Internet content  (for example, news and hacking sites), intended in part to enable  comparisons across multiple states; and&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;a multilingual list of significant key words used to generate significantly larger lists through search engine queries.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To explore Internet filtering, we deploy network  interrogation devices and applications, which perform the censorship  enumeration, at various Internet access levels. These tools download  the ONI testing lists and check whether specific URLs and domains were  accessible from that point on the network. Interrogation devices are  designed to run inside a state (i.e., behind its firewall) to perform  specific, sensitive functions with varying degrees of stealth.  Similarly, ONI distributed interrogation applications to trusted  volunteers who ran the software inside the state. For testing,  depending upon a series of local factors, ONI obtains network access at  multiple levels through a combination of: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Proxy servers,&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Long distance dial-up,&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Distributed applications, and&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Dedicated servers.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;During initial testing, we use remote computers  located in states that filter. These remote computers are located  behind the state&#039;s firewalls yet allowed access to clients connecting  from the wider Internet. We attempt to access the URL and domain name  lists through these computers to reveal what content was filtered, and  how consistently it was blocked. The ONI team also tests these lists  from control locations in non-filtered countries. The testing system  flags all URLs and domains that were accessible from the control  location, but inaccessible from ones inside the target state, as  potentially blocked. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;toc3b&quot; id=&quot;toc3b&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;B. Results Analysis&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;  We carefully analyze the data obtained from testing  to document the nature of filtered content, to explore the technical  capabilities of the target state, and to determine areas that require  in-depth study during testing from inside the state&#039;s firewall. In  particular, ONI examines the response received over HTTP when  attempting to access filtered content. As discussed, when content is  filtered, users often receive a block page. In other cases, filtering  can be less obvious or transparent, appearing to be network errors,  redirections, or lengthy timeouts rather than deliberate blocking. We  analyze HTTP headers ? text sent from the Web server to the browser ?  to derive information about both the server and the requested page.  This information is generally hidden from the end user. However, these  headers can indicate whether content was successfully accessed or was  inaccessible. If an error occurs, the HTTP protocol returns codes that  indicate the type of error in the header. Thus, by analyzing the  headers captured during testing, we seek to distinguish between errors  caused by Internet filtering and more mundane, unintentional network  connection errors.&lt;br /&gt;
We classify results in one of four categories: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;URL is accessible both through the local connection and the remote computer (not filtered);&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;URL is accessible through the local connection  but inaccessible through the remote computer, which returned a  different HTTP response code (possibly filtered);&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;URL is accessible through the local connection  but inaccessible through the remote computer due to a network  connection error (possibly filtered, but not definitive); or&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;URL is accessible through the local connection  but inaccessible through the remote computer; the remote computer  returns a block page (filtered).&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If a URL is inaccessible through both the local  connection and the remote computer, we consider it &amp;quot;dead&amp;quot; and remove it  from the results. This result indicates that the URL&#039;s content was not  available to Internet users generally at the time of our testing,  making the URL irrelevant for our purposes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The ONI team analyzes blocked, unblocked, and  uncertain URLs both at an aggregate level (to estimate the overall  level of filtering) and at a category level (to indicate what types of  content the state seeks to control). We publish state-specific studies,  such as this one on Vietnam, that provide background on a state&#039;s  political and legal system, lists of tested sites, and analysis of  results to reveal and analyze, to the greatest extent we can given the  data we are able to collect, what information a state blocks and how it  does so. We note, however, that our results and analysis capture a  &amp;quot;snapshot&amp;quot; of a state&#039;s filtering system for a specific point or period  of time; governments can and do alter the content they block  dynamically.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;a name=&quot;toc3c&quot; id=&quot;toc3c&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;C. Methods Specific to Vietnam&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In Vietnam, we tested from various access points  (including hotel, cybercafé, and wireless connections) on two ISPs, FPT  and VNPT, with the assistance of an anonymous in-country tester and an  ONI researcher who traveled to Vietnam.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#150&quot;&gt;150&lt;/a&gt; The initial results, from the in-country volunteer, were obtained from  FPT in November 2005. The more comprehensive testing, by the ONI  researcher, was performed in March 2006 on both FPT and VNPT.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Results varied between the two networks. This  network-dependent filtering may represent a centrally-distributed  blacklist to ISPs, and some contacts with in-state experts suggest as  much, though we are unable to say this with certainty. We believe,  though, that filtering occurs at multiple levels in Vietnam, but not  with a high degree of consistency. We also believe that Vietnam filters  for individual and home users, but not for businesses. Since most users  access the Internet through the FPT and VNPT networks, either directly  (57% of ISP subscribers in Vietnam use VNPT, and 20% use FPT) or  indirectly (FPT and VNPT are two of only six entities licensed to  provide gateway access to the global Internet as IXPs), we believe our  results are representative of the average user&#039;s experience.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;toc3d&quot; id=&quot;toc3d&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;D. Topics Tested&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;  Topics to which the Vietnamese state has  demonstrated sensitivity include democracy, political opposition to the  current government, human rights, protests by the Montagnards (an  ethnic group of primarily Christians who supported the U.S. during the  Vietnam-U.S. war) in February 2001 and subsequently,&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#151&quot;&gt;151&lt;/a&gt; the Sino-Vietnamese border accords,&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#152&quot;&gt;152&lt;/a&gt; Buddhism,&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#153&quot;&gt;153&lt;/a&gt; illegal Internet telephony,&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#154&quot;&gt;154&lt;/a&gt; the proposed U.S. Vietnam Human Rights Act,&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#155&quot;&gt;155&lt;/a&gt; and certain religious movements, including Dao Cao Dai (Caodaism).&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#156&quot;&gt;156&lt;/a&gt; In addition, Vietnam has arrested a number of dissidents, whose cases  have attracted international attention. These include Tran Khue,&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#157&quot;&gt;157&lt;/a&gt; Nguyen Vu Viet, Nguyen Truc Cuong, Nguyen Thi Hoa, Nguyen Dan Que, Pham  Que Duong, Nguyen Khac Toan, Pham Hong Son, Nguyen Vu Binh,&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#158&quot;&gt;158&lt;/a&gt; Le Chi Quang, Pham Hong Quang, and Nguyen Dinh Huy.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#159&quot;&gt;159&lt;/a&gt; We tested Web sites related to these topics to discover whether Vietnam blocked access to them.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;a name=&quot;toc4&quot; id=&quot;toc4&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;4. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;toc4a&quot; id=&quot;toc4a&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;A. Summary&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;  Our testing of Vietnam&#039;s Internet filtering found  that the state concentrates its blocking on political and religious  topics. Surprisingly, Vietnam does not block any pornographic content  (though it does filter one site with links to adult material), despite  the state&#039;s putative focus on preventing access to sexually explicit  material. The state&#039;s filtering concentrates on Vietnamese-language  content, and often blocks several times as many sites on a given topic  in Vietnamese as it does those in English. This is characteristic of  states like Vietnam that create their own list of banned sites rather  than relying upon a commercial software provider for block lists.  Vietnam&#039;s ISPs implement filtering differently, with FPT relying on  removing listings for prohibited sites from its Domain Name System  (DNS) servers while VNPT uses a system that displays a &amp;quot;block page&amp;quot;  when users try to access banned sites. FPT&#039;s mechanism is more subtle,  and possibly cheaper to implement, but also potentially more  susceptible to circumvention. Overall, FPT&#039;s blocking was greater than  that on VNPT. Finally, FPT&#039;s blocking has increased over time ? both  within content categories and in the number of such categories with  filtered sites ? and ONI believes this trend will continue.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;a name=&quot;toc4b&quot; id=&quot;toc4b&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;B. Global List Results&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;  In order to enable comparison across states ONI  studies, we have developed a global list that includes 869 sites in 29  categories.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#160&quot;&gt;160&lt;/a&gt; This list includes a variety of sites in content areas that are often  targeted for filtering, including anonymizers (sites that enable users  to circumvent filtering or to access material anonymously),  pornography, religion, and human rights. We test this list in each  state ONI studies. In the years ONI has studied filtering, we have  evaluated changes in state-based blocking and in the sites on our  global list. This research led ONI to update the global list, creating  a second, revised global list. For backwards compatibility, we tested  both the original and revised global lists in states such as Yemen. In  this study, we have migrated to using solely the revised global list.  While this limits ONI&#039;s ability to compare filtering to countries that  we have previously studied (where we tested only our original global  list), this change ensures that our testing is up-to-date and reliable.  ONI will continue to employ the revised global list in our future  studies.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In Vietnam, ONI&#039;s global list testing found  little filtering on either network in March 2006. FPT blocked 12 sites  out of 851 tested (1.4%), and VNPT filtered 5 sites of 821 tested  (0.6%).&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#161&quot;&gt;161&lt;/a&gt; Of the limited sites blocked, both FPT and VNPT concentrated their  filtering on anonymizers ? sites that allow users to bypass filtering  systems and to access prohibited content. FPT blocked 7 of 29  anonymizer sites tested (24%), and VNPT blocked 3 of 28 sites (11%).&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#162&quot;&gt;162&lt;/a&gt; The anonymizer sites blocked by VNPT were also blocked on FPT.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Our results found sporadic, minimal blocking in  other content categories. FPT filtered two Free Web Space sites (of 30  tested, 7%); one Human Rights site (of 30 tested, 3%), that of Human  Rights Watch; one Religion site (of 30, 3%), that of Catholic Online;  and one site related to an entity on the U.S. State Department&#039;s list  of terrorist organizations (of 44, 2%), the Communist Party of Peru  (also known as the Shining Path). VNPT blocked one Free Web Space site  (of 28 tested, 4%), though this site was available on FPT, and the same  Human Rights site filtered on FPT (of 26, 4%; the site is that of Human  Rights Watch). The low level of blocking in other categories probably  results from the state&#039;s focus on filtering Vietnamese-language, rather  than English-language, content.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Notably, though, neither ISP blocked any of the  pornographic sites tested, nor any of the other sites with sex-related  content (such as sex education, provocative attire, gay / lesbian /  bisexual, or dating sites), despite the state&#039;s putative focus on  pornography as a justification for its filtering efforts. Informal  discussions with knowledgeable sources in Vietnam indicate that this is  not an artifact of language (most of the pornographic sites tested are  in English), as similar sites that feature sexually explicit material  in Vietnamese are not filtered either.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Overall, FPT&#039;s blocking in our global list  testing was more extensive than VNPT&#039;s blocking. In every category that  had one or more blocked sites, except one (Human Rights), FPT blocked  more sites than VNPT did; in the Human Rights category, both ISPs  blocked a single site. The global list was thus a microcosm of ONI&#039;s  overall findings, which show that FPT&#039;s blocking is more extensive than  VNPT&#039;s, both in the types of content filtered and in the extent of  sites blocked within a given category.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ONI initially tested filtering on FPT using an  in-state volunteer in November 2005. Those tests found no filtering on  FPT at that date; thus, even the relatively low level of blocking by  the ISP represents a considerable increase in content control in a  relatively short period of time (roughly six months). This pattern fits  ONI&#039;s conclusion about filtering in Vietnam generally: it is  increasing, becoming more effective and more widespread.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a name=&quot;toc4c&quot; id=&quot;toc4c&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;h3&gt;C.  Vietnam-Specific Results&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To investigate Internet filtering on topics  sensitive to the Vietnamese state, we tested three state-specific lists  in addition to the global list: a high-impact list of sites known or  alleged to be filtered, a list derived from links on the blocked Saigon  Bao Web site, and a long list of sites derived from the top results of  Google queries for sensitive terms (such as the name of Vietnamese  dissidents). While we attempted to test all these Vietnam-specific  lists on both ISPs, access constraints prevented us from obtaining  complete results for the long list on VNPT. Thus, the analysis for the  long list below concentrates on FPT, while noting where our limited  results allow us to draw conclusions about VNPT&#039;s filtering. Analysis  for the high-impact and Saigon Bao lists covers both ISPs.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;1. High-Impact List&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ONI developed a list of high-impact Web sites  that focus on material on issues sensitive to the Vietnamese state.  Many of these sites are known or alleged to have been blocked in the  past. The list contains 85 sites in 18 categories. ONI tested the  high-impact list in November 2005 on FPT with the aid of an in-state  volunteer, and an ONI researcher tested the list on both FPT and VNPT  in March 2006. Thus, we can compare the filtering between ISPs as of  March 2006, and can also perform longitudinal analysis to elucidate  changes to FPT&#039;s filtering practices in the six months between our  rounds of testing.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;b&gt;a. Comparison Between FPT and VNPT in March 2006&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Overall, FPT blocked 47% of accessible sites on  the high-impact list in March 2006 (39 of 83 sites, with 4 not  accessible for unrelated reasons), while VNPT blocked 39.8% of  accessible sites (33 of 83, with 4 not accessible). In every category  where at least one site was blocked, FPT&#039;s filtering was equal to or  greater than VNPT&#039;s filtering. FPT&#039;s blocking was noticeably higher in  the politically-oriented categories of Dissidents and Human Rights.  Both ISPs blocked nearly all Pro-Democracy and Political Opposition  sites, along with a significant fraction of News and Dissident sites.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;div align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
  &lt;img src=&quot;/sites/opennet.net/files/VietnamFigure6.gif&quot; 0=&quot;&quot; alt=&quot;Figure 6&quot; border=&quot;&quot; /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
  Figure 6&lt;br /&gt;
    High-Impact List Filtering by ISP
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Our high-impact results also found limited  filtering of Buddhist and Caodai religious material, along with sites  on the Montagnard people and overseas Vietnamese communities. ONI&#039;s  testing returned blocks of the single site we tested in the Forum,  Freedom of Expression / Journalism, and Erotic categories; the filtered  erotic site was the only blocking of sexually-themed material we found  during our testing, despite Vietnam&#039;s purported focus on that type of  content for its filtering regime.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;div align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
&lt;table border=&quot;1&quot; bordercolor=&quot;#000000&quot; cellpadding=&quot;2&quot; cellspacing=&quot;2&quot; width=&quot;500&quot;&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;High-Impact Category&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;FPT Sites Blocked / Tested   (% Blocked)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;VNPT Sites Blocked / Tested   (% Blocked)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Erotic&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1/1&lt;strong&gt; (100%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1/1&lt;strong&gt; (100%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Forum&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1/1&lt;strong&gt; (100%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1/1&lt;strong&gt; (100%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Pro-Democracy&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;9/9&lt;strong&gt; (100%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;8/9&lt;strong&gt; (88.9%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Political Opposition&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;7/9&lt;strong&gt; (77.8%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;7/9&lt;strong&gt; (77.8%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Human Rights&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;8/11&lt;strong&gt; (72.7%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;6/11&lt;strong&gt; (54.6%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Dissidents&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;6/12&lt;strong&gt; (50%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;4/12&lt;strong&gt; (33.3%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Freedom of Expression / Journalism&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1/2&lt;strong&gt; (50%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1/2&lt;strong&gt; (50%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Montagnard&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1/2&lt;strong&gt; (50%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1/2&lt;strong&gt; (50%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;News&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;5/10&lt;strong&gt; (50%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;3/10&lt;strong&gt; (30%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Overseas Vietnamese&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1/2&lt;strong&gt; (50%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0/2&lt;strong&gt; (0%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Religion - Buddhist&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2/6&lt;strong&gt; (33.3%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0/6&lt;strong&gt; (0%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Religion - Caodai&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1/5&lt;strong&gt; (20%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1/5&lt;strong&gt; (20%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Religion - Christian&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0/7&lt;strong&gt; (0%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0/7&lt;strong&gt; (0%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Religion - Muslim&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0/1&lt;strong&gt; (0%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0/1&lt;strong&gt; (0%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Social Issues&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0/2&lt;strong&gt; (0%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0/2&lt;strong&gt; (0%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;
&lt;p&gt;  Figure 7&lt;br /&gt;
    High-Impact List Filtering by Category
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;b. Longitudinal Analysis of Changes in FPT Filtering&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
ONI tested FPT&#039;s filtering from within Vietnam  using our high-impact list in early November 2005 and late March 2006.  Though this is a difference of only roughly six months, we found a  noticeable increase in filtering on the FPT network during that time.  ONI found an increase in overall measures of filtering, such as the  number of content categories in which least one site was filtered and  the aggregate level of filtering. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;div align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
&lt;table border=&quot;1&quot; bordercolor=&quot;#000000&quot; cellpadding=&quot;2&quot; cellspacing=&quot;2&quot; width=&quot;500&quot;&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Criterion&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;November 2005&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;March 2006&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Overall filtering (sites blocked / tested, % blocked)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;15 / 78 &lt;strong&gt; (19.2%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;39 / 83 &lt;strong&gt; (47%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Content categories with at least one site blocked&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;5 (of 18)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;11 (of 18)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;
&lt;p&gt;  Figure 8&lt;br /&gt;
    Filtering Metrics for FPT Over Time
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;p&gt;FPT&#039;s filtering also increased in every content  category with at least one filtered site (except one, Montagnards,  which remained unchanged). &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;div align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
&lt;table border=&quot;1&quot; bordercolor=&quot;#000000&quot; cellpadding=&quot;2&quot; cellspacing=&quot;2&quot; width=&quot;500&quot;&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Category&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;November 2005&lt;br /&gt;
          (sites blocked / tested, % blocked)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;March 2006&lt;br /&gt;
          (sites blocked / tested, % blocked)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Pro-Democracy&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1/9 &lt;strong&gt; (11.1%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;9/9 &lt;strong&gt; (100%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Dissidents&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0/11 &lt;strong&gt;(0%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;6/12 &lt;strong&gt;(50%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Political Opposition&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2/7 &lt;strong&gt; (28.6%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;7/9 &lt;strong&gt; (77.8%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Religion ? Buddhist&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0/6 &lt;strong&gt;(0%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2/6 &lt;strong&gt;(33.3%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;News&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;3/9 &lt;strong&gt;(33.3%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;5/10 &lt;strong&gt; (50%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Freedom of Expression / Journalism&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0/1 &lt;strong&gt;(0%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1/2 &lt;strong&gt;(50%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Overseas Vietnamese&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0/2 &lt;strong&gt;(0%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1/2 &lt;strong&gt;(50%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Human Rights&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;7/11 &lt;strong&gt;(63.6%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;8/11 &lt;strong&gt;(72.7%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Forum&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0/1 &lt;strong&gt; (0%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1/1 &lt;strong&gt; (100%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Erotic&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0/1 &lt;strong&gt; (0%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1/1 &lt;strong&gt; (100%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;
&lt;p&gt;  Figure 9&lt;br /&gt;
    Filtering by High-Impact Category for FPT Over Time
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;c. Language Effects&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
ONI&#039;s analysis of the results of our high-impact  list testing discerned a pattern in Vietnam&#039;s blocking that held over  time and across our different lists: the state filters  Vietnamese-language sites to a greater degree than it does  English-language ones, both overall and in various content areas.  (Since some sites are available in more than one language, the chart  below counts a site in each language category in which it offers  material.) As described in detail below, we believe this pattern  results from Vietnam&#039;s decision to create its own block lists rather  than to rely upon a commercial software program for these lists. In  selecting sites to filter, Vietnam unsurprisingly focuses upon sites  that offer sensitive material in the state&#039;s most commonly-used  language. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;div align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
  &lt;img src=&quot;/sites/opennet.net/files/VietnamFigure10.gif&quot; 0=&quot;&quot; alt=&quot;Figure 10&quot; border=&quot;&quot; /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
  Figure 10&lt;br /&gt;
    Filtering of High-Impact Sites by Language
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;d. Summary&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
FPT&#039;s filtering has increased over time, both in  the breadth of content blocked and in the level of blocking for a given  category of material. Given that the number, percentage, and number of  categories of sites filtered by FPT more than doubled in the six-month  period between our tests, ONI believes it is likely that FPT&#039;s level of  blocking will continue to increase. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;2. Saigon Bao List&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p&gt;We compiled a list of sites linked from the Web  site &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.saigonbao.com&quot; title=&quot;www.saigonbao.com&quot;&gt;www.saigonbao.com&lt;/a&gt;, which lists sensitive sites such as those of  opposition media sources. (The Web site itself is blocked by both FPT  and VNPT.) Our testing found high levels of blocking for sites in  categories such as opposition politics, politics, and human rights and  democracy. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;div align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
&lt;table border=&quot;1&quot; bordercolor=&quot;#000000&quot; cellpadding=&quot;2&quot; cellspacing=&quot;2&quot; width=&quot;500&quot;&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Category&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;FPT&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;VNPT&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Sites Tested / Blocked (% Blocked) &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Sites Tested / Blocked % Blocked &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;General News&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1 / 23 &lt;strong&gt;(4.3%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0/23 &lt;strong&gt;(0%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Human Rights &amp;amp; Democracy&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;39 / 128 &lt;strong&gt; (30.8%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;31 / 126 &lt;strong&gt; (24.6%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Opposition Politics&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;4 / 13&lt;strong&gt; (30.8%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;3 / 12 &lt;strong&gt;(25%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Politics&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;19 / 34 &lt;strong&gt;(55.9%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;16 / 33 &lt;strong&gt;(48.5%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Portal Sites&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0/1 &lt;strong&gt;(0%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0/1 &lt;strong&gt;(0%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Religion&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2/2 &lt;strong&gt;(100%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1/2 &lt;strong&gt;(50%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Vietnam News&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0/2 &lt;strong&gt;(0%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0/2 &lt;strong&gt;(0%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Total&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;strong&gt;65 / 203 (32%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;strong&gt;51 / 199 (25.6%)&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;
&lt;p&gt;  Figure 11&lt;br /&gt;
    Filtering of Selected Sensitive Sites from SaigonBao.com
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While the selection of these URLs targeted sites  believed to be blocked by Vietnamese ISPs, ONI believes that the  pattern of blocking conforms to the overall shape of the state&#039;s  filtering regime by targeting content that could be politically  damaging or destabilizing to the current government. This accounts for  the high levels of blocking of politically-oriented, human  rights-focused, and democracy-oriented Web sites. Religious Web sites  also may be a focus of filtering, but our sample size was too limited  to draw definitive conclusions about this type of content. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;div align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
  &lt;img src=&quot;/sites/opennet.net/files/VietnamFigure12.gif&quot; alt=&quot;Figure 12&quot; border=&quot;&quot; /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
  Figure 12&lt;br /&gt;
    Graph of Blocked SaigonBao Categories by ISP
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The SaigonBao testing results also fit the  pattern for the two ISPs found in our high-impact testing: FPT&#039;s  filtering was more extensive than VNPT&#039;s for every category in which  one or more sites was blocked. As mentioned above, ONI believes that  the trend for Vietnam is towards more extensive blocking, and that  future testing will likely reveal a shift in VNPT&#039;s filtering in the  direction of more comprehensive filtering of material. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h4&gt;3. Long List&lt;/h4&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ONI compiled a long list of over 2000 URLs on  sensitive topics to provide a more extensive picture of Vietnam&#039;s  filtering regime. We created this list using Google queries for key  terms (such as &amp;quot;L? Ch? Quang&amp;quot; Vi?t&amp;quot;) and the Open Directory Project  classification system. (The Open Directory Project, known as &amp;quot;dmoz,&amp;quot;  constructed a massive taxonomy of Internet content and uses volunteers  to maintain lists of the most useful, content-rich sites in each  category.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#163&quot;&gt;163&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;We were able to test the long list on the FPT  network from within Vietnam in early November 2005 and late March 2006.  Due to access constraints, we were unable to obtain a complete run of  the long list on VNPT; however, we did obtain partial results, and the  analysis below notes VNPT trends where there is sufficient data to  support such an inference. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;We combined our testing results with our  high-impact list results, removing duplicate URLs, and then analyzed  the data. Below, we compare results on FPT between the two testing runs  to reveal changes in the ISP&#039;s over time, examine differences in  blocking based on a Web site&#039;s language, look at certain  inconsistencies in FPT&#039;s blocking, and also describe the content areas  upon which the filtering focuses. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;a. Longitudinal Analysis&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
ONI&#039;s long list testing, consistent with the  results from our other testing lists, showed that filtering on FPT has  increased over time. In November 2005, we checked 1988 URLs and found  282 blocked (14.2%). In March 2006, we checked 2012 URLs and found 599  blocked (29.8%).&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#164&quot;&gt;164&lt;/a&gt; FPT&#039;s filtering had thus more than doubled in six months. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;b. Language Effects&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
ONI obtained data on the language used by the Web  sites we tested. The pattern was clear: Vietnamese-language content was  blocked at a higher rate than English-language content.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#165&quot;&gt;165&lt;/a&gt; This trend held over time for FPT and was largely similar on VNPT,  although our smaller sample size for VNPT limits our ability to  generalize about that ISP. For example, blocking was often several  times greater for Vietnamese-language sites than for English-language  ones for key categories such as Politics, Dissidents, Religion, and  Media. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;div align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
  &lt;img src=&quot;/sites/opennet.net/files/VietnamFigure13.gif&quot; 0=&quot;&quot; alt=&quot;Figure 13&quot; border=&quot;&quot; /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
  Figure 13&lt;br /&gt;
    FPT Filtering by Language (November 2005)
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The pattern of greater filtering of sites in Vietnamese rather than in English continued during our March 2006 testing. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;div align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
  &lt;img src=&quot;/sites/opennet.net/files/VietnamFigure14.gif&quot; 0=&quot;&quot; alt=&quot;Figure 14&quot; border=&quot;&quot; /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
  Figure 14&lt;br /&gt;
    FPT Filtering by Language (March 2006)
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The pattern on VNPT was similar, although the  number of sites tested was far smaller. One category, Religion, showed  greater filtering of English-language Web sites than  Vietnamese-language, but this may be a result of the small sample size  (3 sites tested in English, 6 sites tested in Vietnamese, 1 site  blocked in each language). &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;div align=&quot;center&quot;&gt;
  &lt;img src=&quot;/sites/opennet.net/files/VietnamFigure15.gif&quot; 0=&quot;&quot; alt=&quot;Figure 15&quot; border=&quot;&quot; /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
  Figure 15&lt;br /&gt;
    VNPT Filtering by Language (March 2006)
&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Greater filtering in a state&#039;s primary language  rather than in English-language sites is characteristic of states that  create their own list of sites to block rather than employing  commercial Web filtering software. Commercial software makes it easy  for a filtering state to block most of certain content categories ? for  example, pornography or illegal drugs material ? quickly and easily.  The software tends to focus on English-language content, though, for  three reasons: most major Web filtering software companies are located  in English-language states; a large fraction of the Web&#039;s pages in  categories that are frequently targeted for blocking are  English-language; and commercial software providers rarely (if ever)  produce lists tailored to a particular state&#039;s filtering goals (for  example, Vietnamese political opposition) due to the limited market for  such items.&lt;br /&gt;
 States that create their own block lists  naturally focus upon sites that are on sensitive topics and that are  most accessible or likely to be viewed by their citizens. This leads to  an emphasis on sites in the state&#039;s native language, as those are most  likely to be relevant and interesting to its citizens.&lt;br /&gt;
ONI believes that Vietnam does not currently  employ commercial filtering software. The pattern of blocking does not  fit that of any software product that ONI has studied, and FPT&#039;s method  (described below) of deleting DNS records for prohibited sites is  inconsistent with using Web filtering software. We believe that the  greater filtering of Vietnamese-language sites on a given topic  (corresponding to a keyword search or dmoz category) compared to  English-language sites derives from either the Vietnamese state or  Vietnamese ISPs compiling their own block lists rather than relying on  those obtained from commercial Web filtering software providers. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;c. Filtering Inconsistencies&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Another characteristic of Vietnam&#039;s filtering  system that suggests its block lists are compiled by the state or ISPs,  rather than by a commercial software firm, is that its blocking is  occasionally inconsistent. A common trait of individually-created block  lists is that they fail to filter all of the ways by which users can  access a single site. For example, ONI&#039;s Web site can be accessed by  entering &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.opennet.net&quot; title=&quot;www.opennet.net&quot;&gt;www.opennet.net&lt;/a&gt; or opennet.net. Filtering the complete URL  (&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.opennet.net&quot; title=&quot;www.opennet.net&quot;&gt;www.opennet.net&lt;/a&gt;) but not the domain name (opennet.net) will prevent  some, but not all, users from reaching ONI&#039;s site. Both of Vietnam&#039;s  ISPs demonstrate this inconsistency, leading to partial filtering of  some Web sites.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In our November 2005 testing, for example, FPT  demonstrated this behavior with three Web sites. The sites  &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.lenduong.net&quot; title=&quot;www.lenduong.net&quot;&gt;www.lenduong.net&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nguoi-viet.com&quot; title=&quot;www.nguoi-viet.com&quot;&gt;www.nguoi-viet.com&lt;/a&gt;, and &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.vps.org&quot; title=&quot;www.vps.org&quot;&gt;www.vps.org&lt;/a&gt; were blocked at  those URLs, but were accessible at the URLs lenduong.net,  nguoi-viet.com, and vps.org. Similarly, the site quehuongmedia.com was  blocked at that URL, but available at &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.quehuongmedia.com&quot; title=&quot;www.quehuongmedia.com&quot;&gt;www.quehuongmedia.com&lt;/a&gt;. This  inconsistency allowed knowledgeable Internet users to circumvent  filtering by trying multiple forms of a URL ? an FPT user blocked from  reaching &lt;a href=&quot;http://www.lenduong.net&quot; title=&quot;www.lenduong.net&quot;&gt;www.lenduong.net&lt;/a&gt; could try, and succeed, in reaching the same  site (that of the International Vietnamese Youth Network, which  &amp;quot;promot[es] human rights and democracy&amp;quot;) at the URL lenduong.net.&lt;a href=&quot;/studies/vietnam/#166&quot;&gt;166&lt;/a&gt; In effect, this partial blocking allows a low-technology form of circumvention. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;However, by the time